Should we measure professionalism with an index? A note on theory and practice in state legislative professionalism research by Bowen, Daniel C. & Greene, Zachary
Strathprints Institutional Repository
Bowen, Daniel C. and Greene, Zachary (2014) Should we measure 
professionalism with an index? A note on theory and practice in state 
legislative professionalism research. State Politics and Policy Quarterly, 
14 (3). pp. 277-296. ISSN 1946-1607 , 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1532440014536407
This version is available at http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/54589/
Strathprints is  designed  to  allow  users  to  access  the  research  output  of  the  University  of 
Strathclyde. Unless otherwise explicitly stated on the manuscript, Copyright © and Moral Rights 
for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. 
Please check the manuscript for details of any other licences that may have been applied. You 
may  not  engage  in  further  distribution  of  the  material  for  any  profitmaking  activities  or  any 
commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the 
content of this paper for research or private study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without 
prior permission or charge. 
Any  correspondence  concerning  this  service  should  be  sent  to  Strathprints  administrator: 
strathprints@strath.ac.uk
1 
 
Should We Measure Professionalism with an Index? A Note on Theory and 
Practice in State Legislative Professionalism Research 
 
Daniel C. Bowen and Zachary Greene 
Abstract 
Legislative professionalism has played a prominent role in state politics research for decades. Despite the 
attention paid to its causes and consequences, recent research has largely set aside questions about 
professiRQDOLVP¶VFRQFHSWXDOL]DWLRQDQG operationalization. Usually measuring it as an aggregate index, 
scholars theoretically and empirically treat professionalism as a unidimensional concept. In this article, we 
argue that exclusive use of aggregate indices can limit state politics research. Using a new dataset with 
almost 40 years of data on state legislative resources, salary, and session length, we reconsider the validity 
of using an index to study professionalism across the states. We evaluate the internal consistency of 
professionalism components over time, the relationship between components and the Squire Index, and the 
degree to which professionalism components are unidimensional using classical multidimensional scaling. 
We find enough commonality and enough variation between professionalism components to support a range 
of measurement strategies like the use of unidimensional indices (such as the Squire Index), disaggregating 
the components and analyzing their effects individually, or formulating multidimensional measures. 
Scholars should take care to choose the appropriate measure of the concept that best fits the causal 
relationships under examination. 
 
Legislative professionalism has occupied a central place in the study of state politics for 
over four decades. Few concepts in the field have received as much attention as the 
WUDQVIRUPDWLRQRIVRPHVWDWHOHJLVODWXUHVIURP³KRUVHDQGEXJJ\WKFHQWXU\DQDFKURQLVPV´
(Mooney 1995, 47) to institutions of high capacity, equipped with financial resources and staff, 
full-time sessions, and attractive legislative compensation packages. The utility of legislative 
professionalism for the study of state politics is unquestionable; the process has been associated 
with a wide range of political outcomes including the degree and quality of legislative 
representation, public opinions about the legislature, state government spending, and various 
aspects of legislative careers, to mention only a few effects of the process (e.g. Squire 1992; 
1993; Berry, Berkman, and Schneiderman 2000; Maestas 2000; Lax and Phillips 2012). 
 Despite these advancements, the conceptualization and measurement of professionalism 
has received less attention from recent scholarship. Following Grumm (1971), scholars have 
nearly always operationalized professionalism with an aggregate index that combines a number 
of similar, yet distinct, characteristics. Most professionalism measures rely on three core 
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components of professionalism: legislative resources measured as staff or expenditures, 
legislator compensation, and time in session (Grumm 1971; Morehouse 1981; Bowman and 
Kearney 1988; Squire 1992). While scholars have disagreed on the meaning and construction of 
professionalism indices (see Mooney 1994; Squire 1992; Moncrief 1988; Rosenthal 1996; Brace 
and Ward 1999), almost no work examines the implications of measuring professionalism with 
an aggregate index. 
 Measuring professionalism using an aggregate index is a unidimensional measurement 
strategy; we believe this strategy unnecessarily restricts state politics research and comes with 
important limitations that often go unrecognized. Professionalism is a heterogeneous concept 
both empirically and theoretically. Empirically, many states have chosen to professionalize in 
some components more than others, which has led to a diversity of forms that professionalism 
has taken across the states and over time (Moncrief 1988; Kurtz 1992). Theoretically, 
professionalism can have varied (and even contradictory) effects on state politics due to the 
functional independence of the components (Woods and Baranowski 2006; Squire 2007; 
Kousser 2005; Kousser and Phillips 2009; Gamm and Kousser 2010).  Extant professionalism 
indices ignore much of this variation DQGLQVWHDGPHDVXUHWKH³FRPPRQGHQRPLQDWRURIDOOWKH
YDULDEOHV´*UXPP. Under certain conditions, scholars may find it beneficial to 
disaggregate the index into its individual components or to create multidimensional measures of 
the concept as best suits the needs of the research project at hand. 
 In this paper, we present a new, publically available dataset on legislative professionalism 
which measures each professionalism component ± expenditures, compensation, and session 
length ± individually, across the states. These data DOORZVXVWRUHHYDOXDWHSURIHVVLRQDOLVP¶V
conceptualization and measurement. We measure each component biennially from 1973/4 
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through 2009/10; this provides us with the opportunity to examine both short term and long term 
changes in professionalism. We utilize these data to evaluate the measurement of legislative 
professionalism. Conceptualizing professionalism as set of distinct institutional characteristics of 
a state legislature, rather than a single latent construct, we evaluate the internal consistency of 
professionalism components over time, the relationship between components and the Squire 
Index (Squire 1992; 2007; 2012), and the degree to which professionalism components are 
unidimensional using classical multidimensional scaling (MDS).  
These analyses lead to several important conclusions. First, there is simultaneously 
enough commonality and enough variation between professionalism components to support a 
range of measurement strategies like the use of unidimensional indices (such as the Squire 
Index), disaggregating the components and analyzing their effects individually, or formulating 
multidimensional measures. Scholars should take care to choose the appropriate measure of the 
concept that best fits the causal relationships under examination. Second, the Squire Index 
performs well in our tests and accurately taps the commonality between professionalism 
components. Thus the Squire Index appears to be a reliable and valid measure of the broad 
differences between amateur and professional legislatures, matching previous examinations of 
the index (Malhotra 2006; Squire 2007). Yet, there remains substantial variation in 
professionalism components not accounted for by unidimensional indices like Squire¶V. This 
variation is large enough for the MDS solution to be two-dimensional, with the second 
dimension representing over 17% of the variation in the dissimilarity between professionalism 
components across the states and over time. This second dimension appears to match a support-
intensive vs. work-intensive dimension as suggested by Rosenthal (1996).  We conclude that the 
evidence in support of a heterogeneous conceptualization and measurement of professionalism 
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suggests that researchers may benefit from disaggregating the index into its constituent parts. As 
nearly all work on professionalism has utilized an aggregate index, disaggregation provides an 
under-utilized and promising avenue for future research. 
 
Professionalism and State Legislative Reform 
State politics scholars have referred to professionalism in two distinct ways. First, 
scholars consider professionalism as one distinct concept, usually as a measure of legislative 
FDSDFLW\0RRQH\IRUH[DPSOHZULWHVWKDWSURIHVVLRQDOLVP³UHIHUVWRWKHHQKDQFHPHQWRIWKH
capacity of the legislature to perform its role in the policy-PDNLQJSURFHVV´-71). 
Alternatively, professionalism has been conceptualized as the specific institutional characteristics 
used in its measurement (Moncrief 1988), with staff or expenditures for the legislature, 
legislative compensation, and time in session being the most important components. These two 
perspectives are not mutually exclusive; scholars commonly use the term to refer to both overall 
capacity and specific institutional developments, often in the same paragraph (e.g., Squire 2012, 
266-267).  
Such a dual-perspective makes sense given the history of legislative professionalism. The 
study of legislative professionalism grew out of a reform movement intent on modernizing state 
legislatures for the challenges of post-WWII America, most notably the expansion of the role of 
both the federal and state governments and the development of the welfare state. State 
legislatures, now released from decades of malapportionment following Baker v. Carr and 
Reynolds v. Sims, were called upon by reformers to be a primary agent in the new, active state 
(Bowman and Kearney 1988; Mooney 1994; Squire 2007).1 Reformers recommended numerous 
institutional changes to modernize legislatures, from increasing pay and removing constitutional 
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restrictions on session lengths to shrinking the number of legislative seats, converting from 
bicameralism to unicameralism, and streamlining committee systems (APSA 1969; CED 1967; 
&&6/7KHVWDWHV¶SURIHVVLRQDOLVPWKHQFRXOGEHPHDVXUHGHLWKHUDVDQRYHUDOOOHYHORI
legislative capacity or in terms of specific sets of reform policies adopted.  
The development of the professionalism index for scientific use arose out of this reform 
movement. Grumm (1971) first developed the concept by listing characteristics which could be 
XVHGWRGLVWLQJXLVK³SURIHVVLRQDO´IURP³DPDWHXU´OHJLVODWXUHV3URIHVVLRQDOOHJLVODWXUHVDUH
³ZHOOVWDIIHGJRRGLQIRUPDWLRQDOVHUYLFHVDUHDYDLODEOHWRWKHPDYDULHW\RIVHUYLFHVDQGDLGV
such as bill drafting and statutory revision, are maintained and well supported; the legislators 
themselves are well paid, tend to think of their legislative jobs as full time or close to it, and 
UHJDUGWKHLUOHJLVODWLYHUROHDVDSURIHVVLRQDORQH´*UXPP$PDWHXUOHJLVODWXUHVODFN
these features.  
Scholars created early professionalism indices using factor analysis. The indices differed 
mostly in which components are included as input variables (Grumm 1971; CCSL 1971; 
Morehouse 1981; Bowman and Kearney 1988).2  The most important development of the 
SURIHVVLRQDOLVPLQGH[LV6TXLUH¶VPRGLILFDWLon. Squire jettisons some components from 
previous indices and for theoretical reasons focuses on three core variables: legislative staff, base 
VDODU\DQGWLPHLQVHVVLRQ+HDEDQGRQVIDFWRUDQDO\VLVDQGLQVWHDGPHDVXUHVHDFKVWDWH¶V
components relative to those of Congress and then averages the three ratios to arrive at a single 
professionalism score.  
Existing professionalism indices share an implicit latent variable conceptualization of 
professionalism with the underlying concept measured by the shared variation between the 
components. This approach is unidimensional; each state legislature is placed somewhere on a 
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FRQWLQXXPZLWKD³SURIHVVLRQDO´RU³FDSDEOH´OHJLVODWXUHOLNH&RQJUHVVDWRQHHQGDQGDQ
³DPDWHXU´RU³FLWL]HQ´OHJLVODWXUHOLNH1HZ+DPSVKLUH¶VDWWKHRWKHU6TXLUH3 The 
implications of this approach, rather than a component-centric view of professionalism, are large. 
By explicitly measuring the commonalities in the professionalism components, factor analysis-
based LQGLFHVLJQRUHHDFKFRPSRQHQW¶VXQLTXHYDULDWLRQ7KLVGHFLVLRQPDNHVVHQVHXQGHU
certain conditions. For example, if only one dimension exists across the professional 
components, then unique variation separate from the overall commonality might be safely 
ignored; any observed variance is then derived from measurement error or perhaps from some 
other aspect of the component that is conceptually distinct from professionalism. It is also 
possible that all three components so closely covary that they cannot be accurately utilized 
separately in regression analysis. In such situations, it is prudent to combine information from all 
three components rather than to rely on data from only one.  
Yet, these conditions often do not hold. As we show below, the correlation between the 
three components is only moderate; inter-LWHP3HDUVRQ¶Vr correlation coefficients since the early 
1970s rarely reach .7 and often fall substantially lower. Further, there are substantive differences 
in how states professionalize. States can (and do) professionalize in some areas and not others 
(Moncrief 1988). Whether such deviations are politically relevant is an empirical question that 
will depend on the relationships being studied. When that unique variation is relevant to the 
political phenomenon being examined, using unidimensional indices can lead to incorrect 
inferences about the causes and consequences of professionalism. Additive indices like the 
Squire Index (1992; 2007; 2012; King 2000) have a similar problem. While they do not ignore 
unique variation (each change in a component score influences the overall index value), these 
indices are indeterminate; multiple different combinations of professionalism component scores 
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can result in the same Squire Index score, which could lead to ambiguity about the specific 
causal mechanisms connecting professionalism with other aspects of state politics. 
We illustrate this problem in Table 1, which shows professionalism components and 
Squire Index scores (raw values and grand mean values).4  Table 1 shows clearly the 
indeterminacy of the aggregate indices. Similar index scores can mask substantively interesting 
differences in combinations of professionalism component values. For example, Florida 
combines high staffing and expenditures per legislator with short sessions and modest pay. In 
fact, Florida almost triples 0LQQHVRWDDQG$UL]RQD¶VVWDIILQJWRWDOVDQGQHDUO\TXDGUXSOHVWKRVH
VWDWHV¶H[SHQGLWXUHVEXWWKHVWDWHOLPLWVOHJLVODWLYHVHVVLRQVWRRQO\FDOHQGDUGD\VDQGRIIHUV
salaries of under $35,000 a year. In contrast to Florida, Arizona has modest staffing levels and 
resources for the legislature and low salary, but long legislative sessions. The individual 
components illustrate substantially greater variation between Arizona and Florida than the 
modest differences in their Squire Index scores would suggest; the nature of professionalism and 
the types of resources available to legislators in these states are quite different. Florida invests in 
financial resources and staff whereas Arizona provides more time in session for legislators to 
work.  
Depending on the theoretical mechanisms (for example, constituent service, research 
capacity or legislative experience) that link professionalism to other political phenomena, such 
GLIIHUHQFHVPD\PDWWHUIRUDSSURSULDWHWHVWLQJRISURIHVVLRQDOLVP¶VFDXVHVDQGFRQVHTXHQFHV. 
The problem is broader; unidimensional indices cannot capture differences like those between 
Florida and Arizona and simultaneously measure general differences in legislative capacity 
between citizen and professional legislatures. The states have varied both in how much they have 
professionalized and in what ways they have chosen to do so.   
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 It is difficult to know the substantive importance of these measurement concerns. Even if 
the states vary in how they professionalize, the effects of professionalism may still be driven by 
the broad, largely unidimensional difference between citizen and professional chambers. Further, 
it could be that components tend to have similar effects. In such situations it would not matter if 
professionalism is measured as three separate components or if as a single index.  
 Fortunately, while the majority of studies on professionalism have utilized 
professionalism indices, several studies operationalized the concept in different ways. This 
research generally shows that professionalism components often have differential effects on key 
aspects of state politics, and sometimes these effects are contradictory. For example, Ophiem 
(1991) separates staffing from session length and compensation and finds that the components 
had different effects on the independence of the legislature from lobbyist influence. Staffing is 
associated with stricter definitions of lobbying and more required reporting while salary and 
session length were associated with greater state oversight of lobby regulations. Woods and 
%DUDQRZVNL¶VDQDO\VLVRIOHJLVODWLYHRYHUVLJKWRIWKHEXUHDXFUDF\LQVWDWHVILQGVWKDW
staff and expenditures are positively and significantly associated with legislative influence on 
state agencies while compensation is negatively and significantly associated with legislative 
influence. In other words, legislative resources and compensation have contradicting effects on 
legislative influence. Likewise, Kousser (2005) finds contradictory effects of professionalism 
components on the power of legislative leaders and on the presence of restrictive rules for 
legislative committees and thus their agenda-setting powers.  
Other work has identified relationships driven by one component rather than the common 
variance in all components. Long session lengths appear to be the driving force behind 
SURIHVVLRQDOLVP¶VHQKDQFHPHQWRIWKHOHJLVODWXUH¶VSRZHULQEXGJHWEDWWOHVZLWKWKHJRYHUQRU
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(Kousser and Phillips 2009)5 and  also are the reason why more professional states have greater 
congruence between public opinion and policy (Lax and Phillips 2012). Legislative salary is 
associated with the introduction of district-focused bills at the expense of state bills, while 
session length has no such relationship (Gamm and Kousser 2010).   
This research does not demonstrate that measuring professionalism as an index is always 
incorrect, or even usually incorrect. In fact, Woods and Baranowski (2006) show that the 
combined effect of resources and careerism is similar to the estimated effect of professionalism 
measured only as an index. Instead, these works show that disaggregating the index can help 
bring theoretical and empirical clarity which can be missing when components of professionalism 
have divergent theoretical expectations.  As Gamm DQG.RXVVHUQRWH³LWLVFUXFLDOWRFRQVLGHU
WKHLQGLYLGXDOHIIHFWVWKDW>SURIHVVLRQDOLVP¶V@FRQVWLWXHQWSDUWVPLJKWH[HUW(DFKDVSHFWRI
SURIHVVLRQDOLVPFDQDOWHUDOHJLVODWRU¶VLQFHQWLYHVDQGUHVRXUFHVLQDGLVWLQFWPDQQHU´
156). The implication of this research is that separating professionalism back into its constituent 
parts may be a fruitful avenue for state legislative research. In the following section, we describe 
RXUQHZGDWDVHWDQGGLVFXVVRXUDSSURDFKWRDQDO\]LQJWKHSURIHVVLRQDOLVP¶Vinternal 
consistency and dimensionality.  
 
Measurement and Data Collection 
We collected biennial data on state governments from the 1973-74 legislative biennium 
through the 2009-ELHQQLXPPHDVXULQJHDFKRIWKHSULPDU\FRPSRQHQWVRI6TXLUH¶V
indH[VHSDUDWHO\:HIROORZ6TXLUH¶VFRGLQJUXOHVIRUWKHOHJLVODWRUVDODU\DQGVHVVLRQOHQJWK as 
much as possible. We measure legislative salary as the base amount paid to legislators in a given 
year and session length as the number of days the legislature met in the two year period 
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following the beginning of the biennial session. Both items are derived from data published in 
the Book of the States (BOS). &RQWUDVWLQJ6TXLUH¶VPHDVXUHRIVHVVLRQOHQJWKVOLJKWO\ZH
include the days from the regular sessions and special sessions because some states use special 
sessions to circumvent statutory and constitutional limits on the number of days the legislature 
can meet during a regular session (Council of State Governments 1974-2011).6   
  We use state expenditures for the legislature not paid toward legislative salaries to tap the 
staff/resources component of professionalism because staffing data are only available in years 
when NCSL has conducted a survey of legislative staff (Squire 2007). Expenditure data come 
IURPWKH86&HQVXV%XUHDX¶V$QQXDO6XUYH\RI6WDWH*RYHUQPHQW)LQDQFHV7 We divide 
expenditures by the number of state legislators in each state to get a per-legislator expenditure 
amount. Expenditures per legislator data are summed over the biennium and measured in 
constant (2010) dollars. This is the same process King (2000) uses as his replacement for 
6TXLUH¶VVWDIIPHDVXUH,QKLVUHYLHZRIWKH index, Squire (2007) notes that the operations budget 
is conceptually similar to the amount of staff available for each legislator and produces similar 
results.8 
 Other recent examinations of professionalism (King 2000; Malhotra 2006; Squire 2007; 
Squire 2012) have used versions of the Squire Index measured only once a decade; our dataset is 
the first to measure the process in every session over an extensive time period. The data allow for 
the identification of short-term (as well as long-term) causes and consequences of the process. 
Collecting almost 40 years of data was a time-intensive process, particularly since only the most 
recent years of the BOS are available online.  
Our measurement strategy does have some drawbacks. In order to consistently measure 
professionalism components biennially over our long time series, we only utilized information 
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from the BOS for salary and session length. Unfortunately, the BOS coding of session length can 
be problematic. First, the BOS does not consistently report session length data and will switch 
between calendar and legislative days for some states during the time series. Calendar days, even 
when converted to legislative days by multiplying them by five-sevenths, appear to over-estimate 
the actual number of legislative days in session. Second, some session length data are missing for 
some state-years, particularly in the mid-1990s. When possible, we calculate calendar days from 
the formal starting and ending dates and then convert calendar days to legislative dates using the 
same formula as above. In instances when these calculation deviate drastically from typical 
legislative sessions, we code the observation as missing. Lastly, following Squire (1992; 2007), 
we do not include per diem living expenses (vouchered or unvouchered) in our calculations of 
salary, nor do we include any other non-salary benefits (like pensions or health insurance). Our 
measure of salary thus underestimates actual compensation for legislators (Squire and Moncrief 
2010).9 In total, we have 889 completed observations ranging across 19 bienniums.10  
Using these data, Figure 1 displays the median and mean values of the professionalism 
components by legislative session.11 Legislative expenditures grew almost constantly through the 
period of study, with inflation-adjusted median per-legislator expenditures in 2009-10 more than 
double median expenditures in 1973-4. Expenditures growth abated only during the first sessions 
of the 80s, 90s, and 2000s, matching periods of contraction in the U.S. economy.12 We show 
changes in compensation levels in the second panel of Figure 1. The trends clearly differ from 
those in expenditures. The median per-legislator salary fell in the 1970s and 1990s, but grew in 
the 1980s. Session length also (in the third panel) differs from the other two components, 
showing few patterns and much noise during the nearly 40 year period. These trends generally 
PDWFK.LQJ¶VH[DPLQDWLRQRISURIHVVLRQDOLsm change. 
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[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
A Test of Internal Consistency   
How closely do professionalism components relate to each other, and do the relationships 
between components change over time? In other words, is a scale based on expenditures, salary, 
and session length internally consistent?  Here wHXVH&URQEDFK¶Valpha (Cronbach 1951; 
Cortina 1993) which evaluates consistency by examining the interrelatedness of items in a scale 
(Netemeyer, Bearden, and Sharma 2003; Cortina 1993). Overall, professionalism components 
perform well; the coefficient alpha based on pooling all the years in the study is .81. Since 
standard rules-of-thumb suggest that alpha scores between .7 and .8 or higher denote consistent 
scales, professionalism performs well. Figure 2 shows alpha values across each biennium along 
with inter-LWHPFRUUHODWLRQVEHWZHHQFRPSRQHQWV&URQEDFK¶Valpha scores are quite stable over 
time.13 
[FIGURE 2 HERE] 
 However, the magnitude of the contribution of each component to the index varies. 
Figure 2 also shows the inter-item correlation coefficients over time. Salary correlates highly 
with both expenditures per legislator and session length (regular and special sessions) through 
the period of study, with correlations at .63 (salary and session length) and .65 (salary and 
expenditures) when we pool all observations. However, expenditures and session length only 
weakly correlate as 3HDUVRQ¶Vr correlation coefficients frequently fall below .5. The inter-item 
correlation between these two components pooled over the time series is only .49 and drops to 
.40 if California is excluded.14                                                                                                                                                             
 These results highlight the role that salary plays in professionalism indices. The shared 
variation between expenditures and session length matches very closely with legislator salary, 
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but aspects of both expenditures and session length diverge from one another and from salary. 
For example, the additive scale produced when FDOFXODWLQJ&URQEDFK¶Valpha correlates more 
highly with salary (r=.89) than with expenditures (r=.84) or session length (r=.83). Likewise, 
salary correlates highly with an additive scale of standardized expenditures and session length 
values (r=.75), but expenditures and a scale of salary and session length correlate at only .65 and  
session length and a scale of salary and expenditures correlate at only .62.  
[FIGURE 3 HERE] 
 Scatterplots between professionalism components and the Squire Index scores help 
elaborate upon these findings. We show these scatterplots in Figure 3. To illustrate the average 
relationship between Squire Index scores and each component, the figure also displays the trend 
lines between the Squire Index and each component created through locally weighted 
regressions. Points above the trend lines represent observations which receive higher component 
scores than is typical given WKHVWDWH¶V Squire Index value whereas points below the trend lines 
show observations which have low component values given their Squire scores. 
 Figure 3 matches nicely with WKH&URQEDFK¶Valpha analysis. All three components are 
positively correlated with Squire Index scores. It is thus not surprising that alpha shows high 
levels of consistency across the items. Salary shows a particularly close relationship to the Squire 
Index, with divergence from the trend line only appearing among highly professionalized states. 
However, no such close relationship is found between the Squire Index scores and the other two 
components.  Points in the scatterplots fan out quickly as the Squire Index increases, showing 
heterogeneity in the components at each level of the index. This is shown most clearly in the 
expenditures graph (first panel). Expenditure values for states with Squire scores of 
approximately .2 range from $103,000 per legislator in Maine (1979/80) to just under $2,148,000 
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per legislator in Florida (2003/2004). Similar (although somewhat less drastic) variation is 
shown in the session length plot, particularly among states with high Squire Index scores.  
 One possible interpretation of Figure 3 is that states diverge as they professionalize, 
particularly on their allocation of legislative resources and the length of their sessions. Many of 
the states with the high expenditures per legislator have relatively short sessions, while states the 
longest sessions tend to support only moderate levels of legislative expenditures. Of course, such 
relationships occur within the broader context of generally increasing professionalism 
components noted by the strong positive relationships between the Squire Index and each of the 
three components. 
The Dimensionality of Legislative Professionalism 
The analysis up to this point has shown that professionalism components boast both 
commonality and variation. Professionalism components since the early 1970s have followed 
divergent trends, with only expenditures showing regular growth. Our internal consistency 
analysis matches with other conceptualizations of professionalism (Moncrief 1988; Kurtz 1992; 
Kousser 2005) by showing both evidence that the components can be adequately combined into a 
reliable and consistent additive scale (like the Squire Index) and that the inter-item correlations 
between components are not particularly high. In fact, while the professionalism components 
tend to move together across states, they do not necessarily do so. The scatterplots displayed in 
Figure 3 show substantial variation in component values as Squire Index scores increase, 
suggesting the states may choose among divergent forms of professionalism.   
Is there a multidimensional structure to this heterogeneity?15 Empirically identifying the 
number of underlying dimensions in a set of variables is a complicated task. Dimensionality is 
³WKHQXPEHURIVHSDUDWHDQGLQWHUHVWLQJVRXUFHVRIYDULDWLRQ´DPRQJDVHWRIRbjects (Jacoby 
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1991, 27). But there is likely QR³FRUUHFW´QXPEHURIGLPHQVLRQVRISURIHVVLRQDOLVPUDWKHU
dimensionality depends on the context and purposes of data measurement, with a unidimensional 
perspective performing well in certain research situations and a multidimensional one in others 
(Jacoby 1991). The questions regarding professionalism, then, are: how many sources of 
variation exist across professionalism components and is that variation interesting and relevant to 
research on state legislatures? 
As a more rigorous analysis of the data, we use multidimensional scaling (MDS) to 
determine the number of dimensions present in the components.  Metric (or classical) MDS is a 
data reduction technique used to spatially represent differences between observations on a 
number of variables in a small number of dimensions. Distances between points in MDS note 
dissimilarity between the observations on the input variables. We convert the professionalism 
components of expenditures per legislator, salary, and session length to dissimilarity data and 
analyze the data using MDS.16  
The MDS results show a primary dimension that accounts for 72.8% of the dissimilarity 
between observations. However, the MDS solution also includes a substantial second dimension 
representing 17.1% of the dissimilarity between observations. Approximately 90% of the 
dissimilarity between state-year data on professionalism components can be accounted for by 
these two dimensions.17  
 Figure 4 plots the MDS configuration. The x and y axes on the graph are scaled to 
represent the proportion of the variation in the dissimilarities accounted for by each dimension. 
The dominant dimension is easily recognizable as the classic citizen-professional dimension 
identified in previous scholarship. At the left side of the graph are the citizen legislatures of New 
16 
 
Hampshire, Wyoming, and North Dakota. On the right side of the graph are the professional, 
full-time legislatures of Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, and California.  
 This first dimension matches very closely with previous measures of state 
professionalism. Figure 5 shows a scatterplot between the MDS scores and Squire Index values 
(when Squire Index values are available). While there is some variation, particularly in more 
professional states, there is a clear, strong linear relationship between the two scores. In fact, the 
MDS scores and the Squire Index values very highly correlated (r=.92, p=.000). This is all the 
more impressive given that we measure expenditures instead of staff and include special session 
length in our measure of session length. The Squire Index taps nearly the exact same variation as 
the first MDS dimension. We take this as evidence of the construct validity of the Squire Index 
DVDPHDVXUHRISURIHVVLRQDOLVP¶VSULPDU\GLPHQVLRQ   
 However, the vertical dimension in Figure 2 is a little more interesting. This dimension 
grows larger as the values on the first dimension increase; the greatest distances between states 
on the second dimension occur among the most professionalized states. Further, the second MDS 
dimension is positively correlated with expenditures (r = .49, p<.001), negatively correlated with 
session length (r = -.56, p<.001), and uncorrelated with base salary (r = .02, p=.42). These results 
are consistent with the UHVXOWVIURPWKH&URQEDFK¶Valpha tests and the scatterplots shown in 
Figure 3. Salary is the central professionalism component and expenditures and session length 
correlate more highly with salary than with each other. The first dimension, then, represents 
primarily salary and the shared variance between all three components. The second dimension, 
KRZHYHUVKRZVKRZVWDWHV¶SURIHVVLRQDOL]DWLRQKDVGHYLDWHGIURPWKLVVWDQGDUG([SHQGLWXUHV
and session length do not correlate highly with each other because some states have chosen to 
professionalize primarily through staff and resources and other states professionalized by 
17 
 
allowing more time for legislative work. States with positive scores on the second dimension 
have high resources and those with negative values have long sessions, relative to their general 
level of professionalism.18 
 7KLVLQWHUSUHWDWLRQPDWFKHV5RVHQWKDO¶VFRQFHSWXDOL]DWLRQRISURIHVVLRQDOLVP
Rosenthal argues for a legislature-(rather than legislator) centered definition of professionalism 
and suggests focusing on only staff and time in session. Using this typology, states could be 
JURXSHGLQWRFDWHJRULHVKLJKVWDIIVXSSRUWDQGORQJVHVVLRQV³SURIHVVLRQDO´KLJKVWDII
VXSSRUWDQGVKRUWVHVVLRQV³VXSSRUW-LQWHQVLYH´ORZVWDIIVXSSRUWDQGORQJVHVVLRQV ³ZRUN-
LQWHQVLYH´DQGORZVWDIIDQGVKRUWVHVVLRQV³DPDWHXU´OHJLVODWXUHV/LNHZLVHRQHFRXOGWKLQN
of the second MDS dimension as a support-intensive vs. work-intensive dimension representing 
differences between professionalized states while the first is shows the broad differences 
between amateur and professional legislatures. 
 Does this second dimension matter? We can use goodness-of-fit statistics to get a sense 
of when and where the two-dimensional solution offers improvements over the one-dimensional 
solution, although a full accounting of this question is beyond the scope of this paper. Following 
.UXVNDODQG:LVKZHFDOFXODWH.UXVNDO¶VVWUHVVVFRUHVERWKIRUWKHHQWLUHGDWDVHWDQGIRU
each observation using both the first dimension alone and the first and second dimensions. 
.UXVNDO¶VVWUHVVVFRUHVDUHDW\SHRIUHVLGXDOWKDWPHDVXUHVWKHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQWKH
dissimilarities (data points) and the fitted MDS distances between observations. Stress scores 
range between 0 and 1; 0 represents a MDS solution that perfectly matches the input data and 1 
shows MDS scores which do not represent the dissimilarity data at all. The aggregate Kruskal 
stress score using just the first dimension is .19. Including the second dimension cuts the stress 
score in half to .09, a much better-fitting MDS solution.19 These scores indicate a moderate 
18 
 
improvement by including the second dimension, and that the final two-dimensional plot fits the 
underlying data well. 
 Another way of examining goodness-of-fit is to caOFXODWH.UXVNDO¶VVWUHVVVFRUes for each 
observation and then see among which state-years the two-dimensional MDS solution improves 
upon the one-dimensional solution. We present these results in Figure 6. The height of each bar 
shows the improvement in stress scores caused by including the second dimension. The figure 
makes several interesting points apparent. Nearly every state in every session shows improved fit 
when we use the two-dimensional MDS solution (which is expected, a two-dimensional solution 
should not fit the data worse than a one-dimensional solution); the degree of improvement, 
however, varies greatly across states and over time. For many states, particularly those that with 
citizen legislatures, the second dimension offers little improvement. Even some of the most 
professional states like CA, NY, and MI show relatively little improvement from the addition of 
the second dimension.  
Two groups of states, however, show marked improvement: states with low expenditures, 
but relatively long sessions like MA, VT, and CO and states with high expenditures and staff but 
short sessions like FL, NJ, TX, and NV.20 The improved fit for FL, TX and NV is particularly 
noticeable and the benefits of including the second dimension increase steadily over time. All 
three states have seen dramatic population growth and have followed a similar 
professionalization trajectory by sharply increasing expenditures and staff, decreasing base 
salary, but maintaining static session lengths.21 
 
Discussion 
 
We believe these findings have several important implications for the study of legislative 
SURIHVVLRQDOLVP)LUVWWKH&URQEDFK¶Valpha analysis shows that, both over the entire time series 
19 
 
and in individual bienniums, an additive scale of expenditures, base salary, and session length 
can form a reliable measure of professionalism. Second, the Squire Index, the most prominent 
professionalism index, essentially captures the same variation as shown in the first dimension of 
the MDS solution, which accounts for about 72% of the dissimilarity between observations in 
our dataset. Thus, the Squire Index, while not accounting for all variation in professionalism 
components over time, does accurately capture the core conceptual differences between citizen 
and professional legislatures. 
 However, the results presented here show professionalism to be more heterogeneous than 
is typically presented in the literature. Correlations between components are only moderately 
strong. This is particularly true for the relationship between expenditures and session length.  
Further, a substantial second dimension can be extracted from the MDS solution. Previous 
research relying on unidimensional indices have thus ignored a substantial portion of the 
FRPSRQHQWV¶YDULDWLRQDFURVVVWDWHVDQGRYHUWLPH6XFKYDULDWLRQSURYLGHVDIUXLWIXODYHQXHIRU
future research, as the few scholars to utilize a disaggregated or multidimensional approach to 
professionalism have identified divergent effects of the components (Ophiem 1991; Woods and 
Baranowski 2006; Kousser 2005; Kousser and Phillips 2009; Gamm and Kousser 2010). 
 These results suggest conceptualizing and measuring professionalism as one unified 
characteristic of state legislatures is an over-simplification. Rather, professionalism represents a 
set of related characteristics that fluctuate both across states and over time, as state actors tailor 
their institutions to respond to the needs of their state and match their own views of what 
representative government should entail (Rosenthal 1996). This variation is substantial, and 
should not be ignored when possible. Such a view fits both the raw components and the MDS 
two-dimensional solution. We find that citizen legislatures tend to be quite similar, with short 
20 
 
sessions, minimal compensation, and limited support from staff. As states professionalize, and 
choose to invest resources into the legislature, the exact form professionalism takes varies. 
 UlWLPDWHO\WKHUHLVOLNHO\QR³RQH-size-fits-DOO´PHDVXUHPHQWRIOHJLVODWLYH
professionalism. For some studies, a parsimonious, unidimensional operationalization of 
professionalism (like the Squire Index), will suitably measure the concept, particularly if the 
causal theory is indifferent to the types of resources legislators have available to them. Other 
studies may benefit from a multidimensional operationalization by using the raw component data 
presented here or by creating multidimensional measures through a scaling method such as 
MDS. :KLOHH[SHQGLWXUHVDQGVWDIIVDODU\DQGVHVVLRQOHQJWKPD\JRWRJHWKHULQ³V\QGURPHVRI
SURIHVVLRQDOLVPRUDPDWHXULVP´*UXPPscholars have also pointed to the diversity 
of professionalism components (Kurtz 1992). These two perspectives foster not only a range of 
potential causal relationships, but also a range of potential measurement strategies. Our 
understanding of a central concept of American state legislatures is advanced when careful 
scholarship matches the measurement strategy of professionalism with its expected causal 
mechanisms.   
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Table 1. Professionalism Components and Indices Scores in 2003/4 in Six States 
State Total 
Staff 
Expenditures 
per Legislator 
Salary Session 
Length 
Squire 
Index 
Squire Index 
Grand Mean 
South Dakota 75 119.3 13.9 77 0.06 0.08 
Minnesota 684 520.0 72.3 145.2 0.17 0.19 
Washington 826 948.8 76.9 139.9 0.20 0.21 
Florida 1803 2147.9 67.1 123.5 0.22 0.23 
Arizona 682 512.8 55.7 252.8 0.23 0.26 
Ohio 506 629.6 123.7 260 0.30 0.35 
 
Note: Staff data are from the NCSL and include both permanent and session-only staff. Data are available online at 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/staff-change-chart-1979-1988-1996-2003-2009.aspx. 
Expenditures per legislator and salary are in thousands of constant (2010) dollars. Professionalism components 
represent total values in the 2003-04 biennium. Squire Index scores were taken from Squire (2012), while the grand 
mean scores are from Squire (2007). 
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Figure 1. Trends in Legislative Professionalism, 1973-2010 
 
Note: Data collected by the authors from the U.S. Census Bureau and the Book of the States, 1973-2011. 
Expenditures per legislator are measured in thousands of real 2010 dollars. Salary is measured in thousands of real 
2010 dollars. Dashed lines show mean values over time; solid lines show median values. Expenditures have grown 
steadily throughout the time period of study, both in terms of average and median spending per legislator. Salaries 
have been flat or declining since the late 1980s, depending on the measure of central tendency used. Session length 
shows more year-to-year noise but no over-time trends. Y-axis for each graph shows the range of values for the 
bottom 95% of observations for presentation purposes. 
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Figure 2. Internal Consistency of Professionalism Components Over Time 
 
Note: Alpha scores and correlation coefficients calculated by the authors for each biennium, and show the level of 
stability of the cross-VHFWLRQDOUHODWLRQVKLSVRYHUWLPH&URQEDFK¶VDOSKDZDVXVLQJVWDQGDUGL]HGSURIHVVLRQDOLVP
components. 
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Figure 3. Professionalism Components and Squire Index Scores 
 
 Note: Plots show the relationship between Squire Index scores and professionalism components for the years when Squire Index 
scores are available (1979, 1986, 1996, 2003, and 2009). Squire Index values are from Squire (2012), Table 7.6. Dark line displays 
smoothed trend line between the variables using locally weighted regressions. California is omitted due to its status as an extreme 
outlier on expenditures. 
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Figure 4. Two-Dimensional Configuration Plot From Multidimensional Scaling Analysis 
Note: Configuration plot displays the two-dimensional MDS solution. Input variables are standardized professionalism components 
FRQYHUWHGWRGLVVLPLODULW\GDWDXVLQJ6WDWD¶VPGVFRPPDQG Horizontal and vertical axes are presented relative to the proportion of 
variation in dissimilarities attributable to each dimension.  
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Figure 5. Scatterplot of Squire Index Scores and First-Dimension MDS Scores 
 
Note: Only data from 1979, 1986, 1996 and 2003 are included, since those are the years Squire Index values are 
available. Data points are Squire Index values from Squire (2012), Table 7.6 and the first dimension MDS scores 
presented in Figure 4.  
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Figure 6. Improvements in Fit Due to Inclusion of Second MDS Dimension 
 
Note: 9DOXHVDUHWKHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQ.UXVNDO¶V6WUHVVVFRUHXVLQJRQO\WKHILUVWGLPHQVLRQDQGWKHVWUHVVVFRUH
using the two-dimensional solution. Higher values show better fitting solution due the inclusion of the second MDS 
dimension. 
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1 7KH$PHULFDQ3ROLWLFDO6FLHQFH$VVRFLDWLRQ¶V&RPPLWWHHRQWKH$PHULFDQ/HJLVODWXUHUHSRUW
first published in 1954, exemplified such calls for reform. Legislatures were in dire need of 
modernization, arJXHGWKH&RPPLWWHHVLQFHWKH³LQFUHDVHLQWKHQXPEHUDQGVFRUHDQGFRPSOH[LW\
of government services at all three levels of government ± national, state, and local ± has imposed 
vast new burdens and responsibilities upon legislatures that are bound up by old and traditional 
FRQFHSWVRIRUJDQL]DWLRQDQGSURFHGXUH´$36$ 
 
2 See Mooney (1994) for an excellent discussion and comparison of various measures of legislative 
professionalism. 
 
3 It should be noted that the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) collects and 
presents professionalism data by component. NCSL uses these data to group states into 
categories of professional, hybrid and citizen legislatures and refers to these groups as red, white, 
and blue states. For more, see http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/full-and-part-
time-legislatures.aspx.  
 
4 The Squire Index is calculated by dividing each component for HDFKVWDWHE\&RQJUHVV¶YDOXHLQ
the previous session on the component and averaging the three ratios. Grand mean scores replace 
the values for Congress by the average component values between 1979 and 2003, thus making 
the denominators of the ratios invariant over time.  See Squire (2007) for further details. 
 
5 Kousser and Phillips (2009) provide a blueprint for future research on professionalism. First, 
WKH\VKRZWKDWSURIHVVLRQDOLVPZHDNHQVWKHJRYHUQRU¶VSRVLWLRQLQEXGJHWVWDQG-offs using the 
Squire Index and dummy variables for professional, semi-professional, and citizen legislature. 
Then they demonstrate that this effect is driven by session length and not salary (through 
influencing tenure and experience of legislators) or staff (through increases in information) by 
estimating the models with the professionalism components entered individually and one model 
with all three components included. Since the substantive results do not change across the 
models (i.e., salary is insignificant even when session length is not included as a covariate), the 
authors provide excellent evidence for their causal story.  
 
6 For many state governments, one of the houses will stay in session longer than the other.  Under 
this circumstance, we use the longer session length to better capture the potential legislative 
capacity. 
 
7 Finance data are available online at http://www.census.gov/govs/state/. 2011 is the most recent 
year available at the time of writing, which means our last full biennium for most states is 2009-
2010. 
 
8 In our data, staff per legislator and expenditures per legislator correlate at r=.88. Staff data are 
only available from NCSL in 1979, 1988, 1996, 2003 and 2009. When calculated by biennium, 
each correlation coefficient falls between .87 and .93. 
 
9 Squire (2007) suggests that for most states, base salary is a good approximation for total 
compensation. 
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10 Biennium data for most states run from 1973 session to the 2010 session. Since VA, NJ, LA, 
MS, and KY (before 1984) hold off-year elections, these states¶ first biennium starts at the 1974 
session and the nineteenth ends in 2011. 
 
11 The dark lines in the figure show median spline smoothing for display purposes. 
 
12 Squire (2012) shows that staff over time trends have diverged, with professional states like CA 
and NY shrinking staff sizes and amateur legislatures continuing to increase staff. 
 
13 Standardized professionalism components were used instead of the componeQWV¶UDZYDOXHV
when calculating alpha due wide differences in the variance of each component. 
 
14 We calculate these correlations and alpha scores using regular and special sessions to measure 
session length. Using only days in regular sessions reduces all three inter-item correlations and 
the overall alpha score drops to .79. 
 
15 :KLOH&URQEDFK¶VDOSKDLVDXVHIXOWRROWRHYDOXDWHFRQVLVWHQF\LWLVLPSRUWDQWWRQRWHWKDWLWLV
not a test of dimensionality. It is possible to receive high alpha scores with multiple latent 
dimensions if the items have low unique variances  (Cortina 1993). 
 
16 Since the three components are measured on different scales, and therefore have unequal 
variances, the variables were standardized prior to converting to dissimilarities. Classical MDS 
using standardized input variables is equivalent to principal components analysis.  
 
17 These values do not change much over time. When MDS solutions are calculated by biennium, 
the second dimension percentage of the variation in dissimilarities ranges from just under 12% to 
over 22%. Yet both the median and the mean percentages across all bienniums is approximately 
17%. No clear over time trends present themselves when these data are plotted by biennium. 
 
18 It should be noted that the MDS results are not due to our use of expenditures instead of staff. 
When we replace expenditures per legislator with staff per legislator or overall staffing numbers, 
the percent of variability in the dissimilarity data due to the second dimension rises to 18.6. 
 
19 Kruskal and Wish (1978) recommend adding dimensions until the overall stress score is < .15 
or .1. The one-dimensional MDS solution falls just outside that range, suggesting the two-
dimensional solution is preferred.   
 
20 Rosenthal (1996) lists Florida and New Jersey as examples of support-intensive legislatures, 
matching nicely with our conceptualizing of the second dimension here. 
 
21 Nevada quadrupled its expenditures and staff from 1980 to 2010, and Texas more than 
doubled its expenditures per legislator while increasing its number of staff by almost 60%. 
Florida shows a slightly different pattern. Its expenditures more than doubled during the period 
of study, but total staffing levels have fallen by a couple of hundred persons since the mid-1980s 
and 1990s.
